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Abstract 
One of the recurrent motifs in political thought is the idea of the social contract, according to 
which a society, a government, or moral principles depend for their existence on agreements 
between voluntary agents. This association between the social contract and “agreementism” 
implies that there is nothing about the terminology of contracts that distinguishes it from that of 
other types of agreements constitutive of normativity. This essay tests this assumption by 
surveying the terminology of the social contract and by proposing two hypotheses. The first is 
that all attempts at analyzing the idea of the social contract require a formal conceptual frame 
of reference that is distinguishable from agreementism. The second is that social contract 
theories are organized in four trends, even if the authors of each of these trends are unable to 
form a coherent body of doctrine. These trends are the Iberian Catholic version of the Counter-
Reformation; the Protestant individualist trend of the Enlightenment; the quasi-dialectical trend 
of the radical Enlightenment; and the contemporary trend of public morality. 
 




That the very existence of a society, a government, or moral principles per se depend on 




a recurrent motif in Western political and moral thought. This choice of nomenclature, 
however, implies that there is nothing specific about the terminology of social contracts that 
distinguishes it from that of other types of agreements constitutive of normativity.  
This article tests this assumption by surveying the history of the terminology used to 
characterize and define the social contract. It presents two hypotheses. The first is that all 
attempts at analysing the idea of the social contract require a formal conceptual frame of 
reference. The second hypothesis is that different theories of the social contract share certain 
properties that allow us to identify four distinct historical trends, even if the authors of each of 
these trends are unable to form a coherent body of doctrine. These trends are: the Iberian 
Catholic trend of the Counter-Reformation; the Protestant individualist trend of the 
Enlightenment; the quasi-dialectical trend of the radical Enlightenment; and the contemporary 
trend of public morality of political institutions.1 In the end, it should be clear that 
commonplace assumptions concerning the history of the social contract are far from correct, 
such as that there is only one mainstream version of the social contract in the Enlightenment; 
and that contemporary versions of contractarianism owe their ancestry to the theoretical 
mechanisms employed by authors such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant. 
 
1. One Label, Several Traditions 
The extensive literature on the social contract is extremely varied and, ironically, full of 
disagreements. Disputes tend to be threefold. They revolve around the essential characteristics 
of a given social contract theory, the historical origins of the concept, and which writers or 
writings properly belong in a history of the concept. These areas of dispute are intertwined 
insofar as assertions concerning the proper ingredients of the social contract serve as criteria for 
solving problems concerning sources and membership. Those, for example, who deem consent 




constitution of social relations and political power--tend to identify the origins of social 
contract theory in seventeenth-century Protestant political philosophy.2 Others, by asserting that 
any kind of agreement in the creation of normative instances suffices to classify a social 
contract theory, attempt to trace the idea as far back as the ancient Greek Sophists.3  
 What these different approaches have in common is the assumption that agreements or a 
concurrence of wills can produce normativity. For lack of a better word, this general thesis can 
be called “agreementism.”4 This thesis appears in disparate sources, ranging from the writings 
of classical Greek Sophists, some medieval Christian authors, sixteenth-century Protestant and 
Catholic monarchomachi, members of the Catholic Counter-Reformation movements, leading 
modern political thinkers, and contemporary moral philosophers.5 In light of this wide array of 
opinions, it is difficult to maintain that there is a single unified tradition or model of the social 
contract. Aside from the consensus on the centrality of the social contract in early modern 
political thought,6 only few elements are unanimously regarded as constitutive of a theory of 
which one can begin to write a history. However, the reason for this long and varied list in the 
literature of the social contract seems simple: in some way, these movements and figures all 
assume that agreement or consent of the individuals subject to collectively enforced social 
arrangements is relevant to the fact that those very arrangements have some normative 
property.  
 From this general standpoint, histories of the social contract tend to be archaeologies of 
agreementism, whether civil, moral, or constitutional. The straightforward association between 
social contract and agreementism, however, is not bereft of problems. On the one hand, many 
of those who discuss how voluntary actions and free will can become the source of normative 
elements do not speak about contracts per se—they talk about agreements, conventions, 
accords, deals, arrangements, associations, collective decisions, and so forth, but not 




synonymous with contractarianism so that these terms can be used interchangeably without loss 
(or gain) of meaning implies that there is nothing specific about the terminology of contracts 
that distinguishes it from other types of agreement.7 But why then use the terminology of 
contracts in the first place? 
 Furthermore, even those authors who engage directly with the terminology of contracts 
seem to use them for all sorts of purposes, thus generating contrary conclusions. The agents 
involved in social contracts may be individuals, groups or the heads of families, corporations or 
cities, the people as a body, a ruler or king. The contents agreed upon may be to create a 
society, a civil community, a sovereign, a specific kind of political regime, procedural rules of 
justice, or morality itself. The choice of contract may bind in perpetuity or be renewed with 
each succeeding generation; it may be historical, ideal or hypothetical, its expression explicit or 
tacit. The contractees’ motivations may be personal security, economic welfare, religious 
duties, moral righteousness, the cultivation of the arts and sciences, or the mere exercise of 
natural rights. So even if there is such a thing as a social contract tradition, one could hardly 
deem it a coherent body of doctrine.8 Historians of the social contract avoid this difficulty by 
claiming that there are different kinds of contracts involved in the theory.9 But they do so while 
tracing the evolution of the idea of agreementism (either with regard to the origin of the state or 
legitimate forms of government) without explaining why passing references to political (or 
moral) agreements is a sufficient condition for membership of a heterogeneous category of 
contractarianism. 
 It is reasonable to begin by ascertaining the elements of a theory before attempting to 
write its history, and these elements are found in those writings that employ the terminology of 
pacts and contracts explicitly in order to systematically explain the emergence of normativity. 
In this sense, the literature on the social contract (rather than on agreementism) is more 




politics and morality by means of specific juridical concepts derived from Roman law and its 
medieval and early modern commentators. These included the concepts of pact, contract, 
treatise, obligation, right, and their many subdivisions. But this apparatus of juridical concepts 
was in the service of such fundamentally different philosophies that the tradition was as much a 
matter of disputes among opposing theoretical standpoints as of the coherence of its concepts. 
On the one hand, this means that the semantic incoherence of this conceptual frame of 
reference precludes a unified school of thought of “contractarianism”—the social contract 
“tradition” is thus an artefact even when it follows from the attempt to describe its theoretical 
background in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Protestant Europe. On the other 
hand, that there is a specific conceptual framework derived from Roman law is exactly what 
justifies the common ground of social contract theories by establishing a sort of formal unity. It 
follows that the essential characteristics of the social contract should be analysed within the 
conceptual frame of reference established by the terminology of contracts, rather than the other 
way round.  
 The concept of an agreement that is simultaneously social and contractual necessarily 
involves a convention constitutive of a given type of normativity, yet this does not necessarily 
mean that any notion of this kind of convention can be qualified as both social and contractual. 
A proper history of the concept of the social contract should keep this methodological order in 
mind before it can begin to assess its various components. For even though all contracts are 
agreements, not all agreements are contracts; and even if they were, their grounds for existence 
should derive from the concept of the social contract rather than from the mere notion of 
concurrence of wills.  
 A full account of such a framework requires much more than conceptual analysis, for 
the different usages of the social contract ended up being potent weapons in a variety of moral, 




examination of the usage of the language of contracts, its specific characteristics and 
applications thereof might therefore help to determine the different trends in social contract 
theory. Thus, while the outline of social contract thought remains the same—that of inserting 
voluntarist elements (such as agreement and consent) into the public realm, binding rulers and 
ruled alike to legal or moral conventions, as typified by Roman private law—the specificities of 
its models change in accordance with the setting and purposes of different authors. This 
approach enables us to identify at least four conceptual historical trends of the social contract, 
even if the authors in each trend remain unable to form a coherent body of doctrine. The four 
trends are: the Iberian Catholic trend of the Counter-Reformation; the Protestant individualist 
trend of the Enlightenment; the quasi-dialectical trend of the radical Enlightenment; and the 
contemporary trend of public morality. 
 
2. The Iberian Catholic Trend of the Counter-Reformation 
A detailed list of proto-contractarians is likely to include any author who ever maintained that 
the origin of law and justice is conventional. But this is far from being a list of social contract 
theories insofar as it fails to acknowledge the use of the conceptual tools of conventionalism 
associated with private law to legitimize law and justice by means of consent. For classical 
Greek Sophists such as Antiphon and Glaucon, for instance, moral constraints are simply the 
result of the equilibrium of forces between agents whereby the strong are refrained from 
crushing the weak and the weak perform a confidence trick upon the strong. This is very far 
from anything resembling conventional normativity, despite the explicit voluntarist preferences 
displayed by the Sophists. 
 The idea of constraints on ruler and ruled arising from a common arrangement seemed, 
up  until the late Middle Ages, to reflect the social relations and practices of the time and had 




itself. There was, however, implicit in medieval politics the principle of a convention 
concerning government, which stimulated the more speculative inquiry about how the 
community could come into existence out of a mass of individuals.10 This view was developed 
during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries by writers such as Manegold of Lautenbach 
(1030–1103), Engelbert of Volesdorf (1250–1311), John of Paris (d. 1306), and Nicholas of 
Cusa (1401–1464).11 But these writers never stated explicitly that there is such a thing as an 
agreement among individuals constitutive of the community and of the obligations arising 
thereof, which we can call a contract.  
 The thesis that the community is nothing more than a partnership created by the 
agreement of its members can be found mostly in the writings of M. Salamonius, more 
specifically in his De principatu (1512-1514). But even then it appears as an alliance between 
the community and its ruler, without further explanation of how both community and ruler 
come about. Even in later thinkers such as Richard Hooker or Hugenots like François Hotman, 
Théodore de Bèze, Philippe de Mornay (author of the Vindiciae contra tyrannos), or George 
Buchanan, for whom political society was both natural and a human artefact, the idea that 
common consent can constitute a normative realm falls short of a contract theory per se. Even 
though the agreements limited the claims of the rulers, they were to be perpetually renewed in 
the coronation oath as a result of God’s commandment: the choice of government may have 
been at the discretion of the people, but those upon whom the office was conferred would still 
hold it by divine right. What prompted these authors to value consent and agreement with 
regard to the community and its ruler was mostly the religious controversies of sixteenth-
century Europe during which the concurrence of wills was invoked to vindicate the freedom of 





 Yet notwithstanding the value attached to consent, the conceptual setting adopted 
throughout the period still belonged to the Aristotelian tradition developed by Scholastic 
thought. The general view was that humans were social animals by nature, which made it 
difficult to conceive of pre-political life. Moreover, all power was believed to be bestowed by 
God, as St. Paul established in chapter 13 of his Letter to the Romans, which made it difficult to 
consider the deliberate creation of society by the will of free and equal agents. It took a fair 
amount of ingenuity to strike a balance between these Scholastic positions and the built-in 
historical pressure to develop constitutive consent theories.  
 Attempts at such ingenuity can however be found in the works of various theologians 
associated with the sixteenth-century Iberian Thomist revival that extended from Salamanca to 
Évora and Coimbra.12 What is peculiar about their writings compared to previous endeavours is 
that they made use of specific legal terminology to introduce and legitimize a novel kind of 
regulation vis-à-vis public relations. Phrases and expressions such as status naturae (as used by 
Molina),13 societatis foedere (as used by Juan de Mariana),14 contractus aut quasi contractus, 
primaeva institutione, morale vinculum, transferre potestatem (as used by Suarez)15 start 
recurring more and more and become widely used in later works on the social contract.  
 Perhaps with the exception of Suarez’s works, there is no systematic account in these 
writings of the social contract though there is an attempt to incorporate the legal terminology of 
conventions with regard to a common theme: the lack of legitimacy of the imperialist claims of 
the Hispanic crown towards the native peoples of the Americas. Consent theory, which proved 
more and more influential either in arguments regarding the freedom of religion or for and 
against divine right monarchy, now served a new purpose—that of regulating the relations 
between conquistadores and the American Indians without contradicting the papal camp’s 
religious expectations of expansion. These authors, theologians and missionaries, wanted to 




whereas religious communities were created directly by God and served purely spiritual ends.16 
Although they still believed that the human urge to form a society of any kind might be the 
product of nature and divine inspiration, they maintained that the people were prior to their 
rulers and were capable of participating in their appointment. Spiritual power is bestowed by 
God directly on the church, but temporal power is bestowed by God directly on communities, 
which in turn, by means of election or any other form of collective appointment, can organize it 
at their will regardless of religious commitments.17 In other words, they held that peoples are 
natural and present beforehand in Creation, but that their political arrangements are instituted 
by election or consent. Agreements are then constitutive not of society but rather of the political 
order. Overall, these authors seemed to believe that there is a distinction between a people and 
a political community. This entails that those agreements by which rulers are appointed are not 
formed between the king and the people,18 but rather between the elements that comprise the 
people. 
 This standpoint, however, was not systematically treated so as to make the neo-Thomist 
interpretation of natural law cohere with a novel consent theory, since communities were 
thought to be created by God and to pre-exist their individual members, who in turn agreed to 
constitute a binding political power for their communities. Still, the proposition that political 
and moral normativity should be compatible with some form of consensus, even if based 
merely on custom, remained contentious. Thus the difference between authoritative ruling and 
consent of the governed could only be reduced by detecting an explicit contractual element in 
law that emanated from the ruler’s will as a deduction of natural law. This task was undertaken 
by Suarez whose basic premise was the Aristotelian commonplace that men naturally want to 
live in communities whose power is directly bestowed by God, whereas the political 




bound together by some compact did they form a political community as distinct from a mere 
multitude.20 
 However, Suarez is not straightforwardly a voluntarist insofar as political obligation 
derives from consent only if it follows from natural law, and therefore political power emanates 
from communities by means of natural resultancy through consent. Also, he is far from being 
an individualist insofar as men consent to live in pre-existent societies and their agreements 
beyond mere consent are constitutive only of that “mystical body” beyond the “natural body” 
of the people.21 But this does not mean that his efforts fall short of a theory of the social 
contract in the formal sense. On the one hand, the Thomist tradition of natural law is never 
fully dismissive of a voluntarist element in determining the exact contents of human law. The 
Scholastic mechanism of derivatio per modum determinationis requires human will to add 
certain contents to the natural law, and there is no reason why this voluntarism cannot consist 
of a concurrence of different wills. 
 On the other hand, Suarez’s Aristotelian framework (in which communities precede 
their members logically and chronologically) shows his concern to dispel the idea that the pre-
civil condition implies a solitary existence and that the power exercised over the community 
has its source in isolated individuals.22 As an attentive reader of Cardinal Bellarmine’s works 
and of his Iberian precursors, he always traces political power back to God via the people, 
which is exactly his main contention in his Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith against 
the Errors of Anglicanism against James I’s Apology for the Oath of Allegiance.23 But this 
methodological commitment is also a reliable expedient for invoking contracts to limit the 
power of Hispanic sovereigns vis-à-vis indigenous peoples overseas: if all communities are 
natural and their political orders freely contracted, then Hispanic sovereigns are expected to 




language of the rights of man, this opened the way to a universal law of peoples via the 
mechanism of the social contract. 
 With regard to their use of contract terminology, it might in fact be misleading to 
consider this trend as part of the Catholic Counter-Reformation, seeing that its primary 
addressees were not the writers of the Reformation but the Portuguese and Spanish crown 
officials who used theological and political arguments to legitimize their conquests and 
dominion over the newfound lands of the Americas. Thus, unlike the debates that raged in 
Europe on religious conflict and toleration at the time, these theologians employed the language 
of contracts to defend the indigenous peoples’ rights to self-determination, and thereby to limit 
Iberian imperialist aspirations.  
 By doing so, the Iberian trend ended up producing two historical curiosities. On the one 
hand, consent theory was seen as enforceable in the creation of political authority through a 
conceptual frame of reference pertaining to private law. This meant that political obligations 
arising thereof acquired a similar status in both the public and the international realm, which 
entailed that there is a law between nations (jus gentium) consistent with natural law, which is 
also part of positive law that binds all nations alike, for no political sovereign is recognized as 
having the authority to bind peoples that instituted their own authorities. This forms a sort of 
pre-Westphalian international public law. On the other hand, the appeal to contracts rejected 
the existence of divinely-ordained temporal sovereigns, which means that the first appeals to 
secularism in politics (specifically, the creation of constitutional limits to sovereign power) 
within the social contract framework emerged from a strictly theological setting. Thus 
correlatively, the origins of the conceptual framework of the social contract lay in the striving 
to sever the connection between God and temporal rulers. 
 




Regardless of the disputes on the defining characteristics of the social contract and the term that 
best fits the social contract theorist, there is little doubt in the literature that seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Protestant Europe was the golden age of contractarianism. Myriad causes 
have been proposed to explain this: increasing interest in biblical exegesis and in Old 
Testament history; the ideas and practices of the Reformed Churches; the legal arrangements of 
the German Empire, Aragon, Switzerland, Poland, and Holland; the rise of capitalism; the 
gradual breakdown of the extended family; the increasing appeal of urban life to the detriment 
of rural areas; the rise of individualism and rationalism; and the impact of the Scientific 
Revolution.24 Whether all or only some of these factors contributed to the growing popularity 
of the new terminology derived from civil law to explain the origins of politics and morality is 
a subject for a separate study. The historical factors that seem most relevant to our concerns is 
that religious conflict and political turmoil brought to the fore the need to address issues of 
toleration and normative legitimacy under a new frame of reference. 
 The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 marked the end of feudalism and the birth of the 
modern nation-state: a popular-based sovereignty, confined to a certain territory, and exercised 
by national citizens to the exclusion of all others. This new national model presupposed the 
coexistence of different sovereign powers as expressed in its four grounding principles: self-
determination of the state, the legal equality between states, non-intervention in a state’s 
internal affairs, and mutual non-aggression. The theorists who defended this new political 
entity now had to adopt scientific methods of analysis, specifically the resolutive-compositive 
method whereby the existence of a whole is explained by the activities of its constituent parts.  
 The first references to social contracts in seventeenth-century Protestant political 
thought predate these developments. Both Althusius and Grotius, for instance, considered pacts 
and conventions as the source of political authority and obligation, but their motivations and 




previous century since their aim was still to establish the grounds for an international public 
law and they still adhered to the Aristotelian scientific method whereby a whole precedes its 
parts.25 And yet it was the effort to develop a philosophical explanation of the nation-state by 
using the resolutive-compositive method that opened the way to agreementism and the 
language of contracts. Thus, regardless of their differences, authors such as Hobbes, Pufendorf, 
Locke, and later Rousseau and even Kant expounded their social contract theories by means of 
common principles derived from their shared frame of reference.26 
 The first of these common principles was the “baseline principle” or the idea of 
institution: political authority stems from (and can be explained by) the hypothetical and 
ahistorical notion of pre-political human beings agreeing to leave a state of nature and submit 
to some form of government. This entails that political power derives neither from God nor 
from Nature but is rather a human construct—a normative artefact. So, not only is power 
instituted but it is instituted by human actions that are conceivable as corpora simplicissima in 
a pre-societal whole. The second is the “reciprocity principle,”27 or the idea of limitation: 
political power is sovereign not because it is the absolute power to do whatever it can or wants, 
but because it is the actualization and representation of the power transferred from individuals 
and is thereby limited by their consent. The social contract institutes political power by 
establishing what the latter can do, must do, and cannot do; and, almost paradoxically, such a 
reciprocity of responsibilities between government and the governed is not simply grounded in 
morality but is part of the very process of strengthening that which is instituted, since limited 
power in this sense (because more effective in producing obedience) is more powerful than 
unlimited power.28 
 With regard to a common conceptual frame of reference, the underlying reason for the 
use of contractual language is not dissimilar from that in the Iberian Catholic trend: to transfer 




differences that the leading Enlightenment authors establish between pacts and contracts, their 
classical model of legal conventions is shared by most contracts of Roman private law: 
consensual contracts (contractus ex consensu as found in sale, partnerships (societas) or 
mandates (mandatum), as opposed to real contracts (or contracts in re).29 
 Firstly, the consensual contract deriving from Roman law is a legal agreement whereby 
deliberative agents concur in mutual promises. From the viewpoint of modern contractarianism, 
this entails that the contractees are individuals capable of rational thought. The contract is the 
instrument whereby at least two entities share a common rational process. In this sense, the 
contract’s stipulations can also be considered requirements of reason. 
 Secondly, this type of contract presupposes the existence of distinct entities that concur 
in their deliberations. The contracting parties necessarily pre-exist the contract itself. This 
entails that the coexistence (whether stable or unstable, but always ephemeral) of individual 
entities prior to the contract is in fact a condition of the validity of the contract. These entities 
must already be capable of deliberating, promising and verbalizing; and they must also be in 
possession of something that they can give up, transfer or perform. The contract turns naturally 
pre-existent individuals into contracting parties (members of a society). Individualism is the 
starting point of the social contract and is therefore necessarily natural. Even in versions of 
methodological individualism that explain how social phenomena result from the motivations 
and actions of individual agents, the contractual device is artificial in the natural process of 
individualism. So the contract is constitutive of society and of citizenry, not of individuals per 
se. 
 Thirdly, the contract comes about at a foundational moment that establishes specific 
contents and their corresponding effects. In general, some form of ritual (whether gesticulation, 
speech or writing) marking the exact moment of consensus is required to confirm that a 




mere consent occurred or was expected. Social contract theories tend to interpret the 
mechanism of transferring rights by means of this model. The contract becomes valid in three 
steps: formation (consensus); contents (normative stipulations, or obligations); and effects 
(performance). There is already a contract from the very first moment of consensus, and its 
contents are enforceable even if the performance has not yet begun. The contract is hence a 
collective promise that, when stated, inscribes through a unique moment in the present the 
continuous demand for the performance of a future action30—and it resembles a fiat in that it 
sets here and now what was not here before and establishes effects that are to extend in time 
beyond the primary concurrence of volitions. The contract therefore conditions a future 
situation and remains binding until the contents agreed upon are performed in full. Its binding 
force is independent of its actual performance. 
 
4. The Quasi-Dialectical Trend of the Radical Enlightenment 
If there is an alternative to the mainstream Enlightenment versions of the social contract, it is 
unmistakably to be found in Spinoza’s writings. The defence of a “radical Enlightenment,” 
with Spinozism as its backbone,31 is sufficient reason to impel the historian of social contract 
theories to review this concept in Spinoza’s political theory. Many scholars claim that 
Spinoza’s use of the social contract tends to fade away in his writings as he drifts further away 
from the mainstream Enlightenment. He mentions it in his earlier political work, the 
Theological-Political Treatise (TTP) of 1670, much less so in the Ethics, and only slightly in 
his Political Treatise (TP), published posthumously in 1677. This has led to the generally held 
belief that Spinoza progressed from being a social contract theorist to being something else 
entirely.32 In this sense, Spinoza’s conception of the social contract would not be altogether 




difference being that in certain writings he seems to adopt it, whereas in his later writings he 
seems to reject it. 
 There are strong reasons to discard this view. On the one hand, even Spinoza’s 
contractarianism in the TTP has something distinctly peculiar about it, since it already fails to 
provide a notion of the social contract that is fully compatible with the general characteristics 
identified in the mainstream version. On the other hand, the language of contracts appears in 
both the Ethics and the TP—with expressions such as “natural agreements,” “contracting 
parties,” and “contracts or laws”—often being used by Spinoza in discussing the origins of 
power and legitimacy.33 This means not only that Spinoza’s so-called earlier contractarianism 
should be reconsidered but that his so-called later non-contractarianism can only be established 
on the basis of a prior consideration of his contractarianism. 
 In the TTP there are explicit references to pacts as constitutive sources of politics, albeit 
with substantial differences compared, for example, to Hobbes. In the Ethics, there are explicit 
references to contractual mechanisms of formation and performance (such as promises and 
transferences), even though the doctrine of mimetic affects seems to moderate the importance 
of contracts. In the TP the multitude emerges as a new constituent concept that seems to 
emphasize the power of plurality to the detriment of the contract’s unity, which explains why 
the term “contract” appears only in poorly edited paragraphs,34 or in short excerpts about 
international relations.35  But before evaluating these changes as  “an evolution,”36 it should be 
noted that Spinoza always seems to drift away from the Protestant individualist version of the 
social contract even when he mentions it explicitly in the TTP, as claiming, for example, that 
contracts are a concurrence of affects and imagination rather than of wills or of reason.37 
 Since according to Spinoza most people are not guided by reason in their everyday 
lives, although it is the kind of knowledge through which common ideas emerge, what they all 




fact that most people are not guided by reason, they can always reach some kind of social 
consensus. This means that the interplay of affects among people reproduces in the realm of the 
imagination that which the dictates of reason produce necessarily. If there is social agreement, 
it must necessarily conform to reason since reason constitutes a common ground for the life of 
human beings even though this contract’s prime matter is mostly passionate and imaginative 
rather than rational. His statement that people “had to make a firm decision, and reach 
agreement, to decide everything by the sole dictate of reason”38 does not imply the rational-
deliberative model of a contract, but rather the effort to achieve compatibility between a 
specific historical condition of people living in common, in societies and his conception of 
commonality dictated by reason. Spinoza’s contract is imaginatively produced and necessarily 
reasonable, but only seldom rational. 
 There are other peculiarities in Spinoza’s understanding of contracts. For instance, his 
understanding of the state of nature changes from work to work. In the TTP, he conceives it as 
a state where people live in isolation, as if each were a sort of Adam in an anti-Garden of Eden; 
in the Ethics, he sees people acting in a hostile environment as “adult children”; and in the TP 
the state of nature is said to be the genesis and unfolding of political societies.39 The language 
of contracts in the TP coexists with the concept of the multitude, which requires a coincidence 
between agreement and cooperation. This means, on the one hand, that individuals are 
simultaneous with the multitude; and, on the other hand, that any “transferences” empowering 
the political sphere must be continuous and based upon a continuous constituent power, rather 
than performed at a unique moment. These transferences must be permanently renewed and 
cannot have a single foundational moment. Even in the TTP, the pact remains binding only 
insofar as people continue to regard it as useful; it becomes valid not in a single foundational 
moment of passionate circumstantial and imaginative consensus, but rather through a 




 Unlike the Protestant individualist model of contractarianism, Spinoza’s model is not a 
consensual contract but rather a contract in re—the moment of formation is inseparable from 
the moment of performance, which means that the contract is formed when at least one of the 
parties performs one of the obligations inherent in it. The threefold sequence of formation-
content-effect, typical of consensual contracts, now becomes a single moment of formation 
whereby the performance coincides with the act whereby the agreement is formed. In such 
contracts (e.g., the loan for consumption [mutuum], the loan for use [commodatum], the deposit 
[depositum], and the pledge [pignus]), an action is required in order to consider the contract to 
have been formed in the first place—the typical case of which is the transference of a given 
asset. Hence, the deposit is formed only when the thing in question is deposited, the loan is 
formed when the actual amount is loaned, and so forth. For Spinoza, agreements require the 
actual transference of power since the act of promising in a contract is not enough to preserve 
its validity and binding force: something (re) has to be transferred to produce the agreement. 
Thus Spinoza’s social contract resembles in its formation the generalized position of one active 
party in contracts in re. 
 According to Spinoza political societies derive ultimately from the consent of 
individuals. If this defines contractarianism, it might be agreed that Spinoza was always a 
contractarian. However, this is not the predominant perception in modern social contract 
theories. Contractarianism is typically associated with any doctrine according to which the 
conclusion of an agreement creates by itself alone an irreversible political obligation, regardless 
of any subsequent fluctuation in the interplay of forces between individuals. In this sense, it 
might be agreed that Spinoza was never a contractarian, not even in the TTP. The only way to 
consider as contractarian someone who believes political societies derive from individual 
consent originating from a variety of conflicting forces is to accept that this inaugurates a novel 




 Consequently, Spinoza rejects specific traits to be found in consensual contracts albeit 
still using the contractarian conceptual framework. More specifically, his final excursus on the 
origins of political power does not follow the methodological sequence beginning with existent 
individuals to and culminating in a transcendent-like political authority. Spinoza strives to 
explain the contractarian framework as part of a project of imaginative productions of common 
political spheres, which is why he interprets it as a process of plurality and immanence in 
which human individuals and society develop simultaneously. The contract is thus not the 
constitution of a political unified structure of transcendent power, but rather the name given to 
the processes for projecting the imagery of unity through which individual empowerment 
occurs. However, it is still a social contract.40 
 
5. The Contemporary Trend of Public Morality 
The revival of social contract theory in the second half of the twentieth century (by John 
Harsanyi, John Mackie, David Gauthier, T. M. Scanlon, James Buchanan, and John Rawls, 
among others) was an effort to trace the origins of normativity to the consent of its addressees  
by using the same terms as those used in the Protestant contractarian model.41 In some cases, 
the reason for using the language of the social contract boils down to this alone. However, 
although contemporary uses of the social contract are not necessarily connected to the eventual 
decline of the nation-state, what prompted modern political theorists to adopt it as a model for 
proved very difficult to reproduce. For just as Hobbes’s social contract differs fundamentally 
from Rousseau’s, so too do Gauthier’s and Buchanan’s conceptions of contracts differ from 
Rawls’s and Scanlon’s. Yet it is particularly the motivations driving contemporary theories that 
seem to differ from those of early modernity: the agreements discussed focus mainly on 
morality rather than on  political society tout court. The difference between the two trends is 




contemporary contractarians are mostly concerned with moral contracts, even if in some cases 
they apply only to the public sphere.  
 The role of the social contract in the early modern trend is to explain the origins of 
coercive political authority or to evaluate the legitimacy of state coercion.42 There was no 
question of agreements creating morality, although they could generate moral or political 
obligations. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century social contracts were thus tools for theorizing 
the origin and legitimacy of political obligation and sovereignty rather than attempts to ground 
morality in mutual consent. In contrast, the contemporary revival of the social contract is an 
attempt to distinguish the question of what generates political obligation from the question of 
which social institutions are mutually beneficial and justified vis-à-vis their addressees or 
subjects. The contract functions as a framework for ethical justification in the sense that those 
who are subject to a given social arrangement agree to confer on it a kind of morally-charged 
normative property (e.g. justice, legitimacy, rightness, etc.). 
 However, there are different ways of understanding the role of justification by means of 
agreement. Some authors attempt to ground morality in the rational agreements of utility 
maximizers who negotiate mutual constraints from their different bargaining positions—they 
thus ground moral principles in the creative self-interest of individuals who adopt constraints 
on their behaviour in order to maximize their own benefits.43 Other authors try to account for 
the authority of moral standards and the nature of right or wrong by resorting to principles that 
no one can reasonably reject as a basis of informed agreement—principles that are justifiable to 
moral agents capable of establishing basic moral conventions, even if such conventions do not 
emerge from actual agreement.44 And other authors focus on the design and justification of 
political and social institutions as a matter of agreements pertaining to public morality rather 
than to individual consent: in their view, justifying social arrangements is equivalent to 




institutions, which requires showing that all citizens have reasons to favour those 
arrangements.45 In this latter case, the contract is usually called “political” because it aims 
mostly to set down the social framework for a liberal society rather than to determine general 
moral principles. But it still falls short of being “political” in the sense of providing an 
explanation of the origins of political power and authority, as modern contractarians 
endeavoured to do. Its purpose is therefore mainly to identify the procedural principles by 
which political power and authority acquire a moral normative property that helps to justify 
them in the eyes of their subjects. This is still morality, albeit applicable only to political 
institutions or to “the basic structure of society.” 
In all of these versions, the emphasis is on the importance of providing reasons for 
social arrangements rather than on establishing how they are binding in the first place. What 
seems determinant in contemporary uses of the social contract is therefore not so much consent 
to the exercise of authority, but rather agreement (or lack of rejection, in Scanlon’s version) in 
the sense of providing reasons for endorsing specific social arrangements. Agreements are thus 
reason-giving experiences whereby the act of agreement is indicative of the reasons citizens 
have in specific social and political relations.46 Consequently, the contract does not merely 
determine which acts are right and wrong but it also establishes what reasons and forms of 
reasoning are justifiable. Even Rawls announced that the aim of his conception of the social 
contract was to settle “the question of justification… by working out a problem of 
deliberation.”47 Posing the problem of justification in terms of a deliberative or bargaining 
problem is thus a kind of heuristic: the contract is not so much a binding act (a performative 
that somehow creates obligation) as it is a litmus test of the reasons revealed by individual 
agents in deliberating about social arrangements. The real issue is no longer the origin of 
normative authority but the procedures of deliberation about which principles (substantive 




 Yet despite the chronological gap, what ultimately substantiates the consideration of 
contemporary social contract theories as a novel trend distinct from the earlier uses of the 
concept is that the focus on principles of justice rather than on the origins of society and 
political authority mitigates the connection to a specific terminology of contracts. The 
preference for agreements as reason-revealing instances over agreements as constitutive 
sources of binding normativity leaves room for considering the latter as artefacts belonging to 
“the Museum of Eighteenth-century Thought,”48 and to limiting the age of the social contract to 
the years between Hobbes’s Leviathan and Rousseau’s Du contrat social.49 Even in a cursory 
overview of contemporary social contract theory it is difficult to discern why the concept is 
social and contractual since it is neither constitutive of the former nor necessarily binding as 
the latter. Rather, the term “social contract” appears as a conceptual tool in theories of “moral 
agreementism” that follow the basic premise according to which precepts for living together are 
not “handed down from on high.”50 That it has been inserted into a conceptual frame of 
reference comprising the terminology of contracts resulted from the assimilation of the baseline 
and reciprocity principles underlining by the modern Protestant trend, which are nevertheless 
insufficient to identify the essential attributes of any kind of social contract whatsoever. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This essay takes issue with several claims associated with the history of the idea of the social 
contract. Firstly, it rejects the view that social contract theories originated in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Protestant political thought by arguing that the Neo-Scholastic origins of the 
concept can be considered already a kind of social contract theory, albeit not in the same sense 
of later social contract theories. In fact, the terminology of contracts as applied to the idea of 
consent of the governed should not to be simply associated with the tradition of European 




on how certain conceptual cornerstones of secularism emerged from theological disputes. In 
addition, the attempt to posit a formal social contract tradition as a conceptual frame of 
reference makes those discussions about membership often fruitless. For instance, whether 
Suarez was a social contract theorist or not seems beside the point insofar as this question 
revolves around the hypothesis of whether or not he was a social contract theorist of the same 
kind as later Protestant social contract theorists. Still, that a negative reply to the latter 
hypothesis does not necessarily entail a negative reply to the first hypothesis. 
 Furthermore, the arguments presented here rebut other assumptions that have become 
commonplace, such as that there is only one mainstream version of the social contract in the 
Enlightenment, and that contemporary versions of contractarianism owe their ancestry to the 
theoretical mechanisms employed by authors such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. 
With regard to the first contention, Spinoza’s version of the social contract is very different 
from the traditional model of consensual contracts applied to politics and law; and it is radical 
in the sense of providing a novel interpretation of how agreement is actual and potent rather 
than obligatory and potential in his naturalist theory of democracy. Whether or not his view 
was followed by the so-called Spinoza cercle is a problem that opens a new path for future 
research. And with regard to the second contention, it is interesting to see how contemporary 
social contract theorists misconstrue the origins of the concept to facilitate their discussions of 
how morality applies to the public realm, thereby shifting the focus on the status of normativity 
arising from the social contracts. Still, their many differences and disputes are insufficient to 
adumbrate the importance they attribute to the very idea of a social contract in their theories. 
This too seems to open a new path of research regarding the contractual nature of agreements in 
contemporary social contract theories. In the end, these contentions provide as many new 






                                                          
1 I should here issue a caveat. Since I do not offer close textual analysis of the primary 
sources, readers may take issue with the ‘comprehensive’ scope of my approach and my 
criteria for deciding which authors are to be included in each of these trends. However, 
the problem of who belongs to which trend (each of which consists of myriad debates 
that cannot be dealt with in a single article), is secondary to my primary objective: to 
demonstrate that there are different trends of social contract theory in the first place, 
which requires a broad historical approach. I have chosen to use ‘trend’ rather than 
‘category’ or ‘type’ because it suggests theoretical tendencies that have arisen from 
particular historical, religious, political, and social contexts.  
2 Cf. Gierke, Natural Law. 
3 E.g., Gough, The Social Contract; Medina, Social Contract Theories, 2–3; Lessnoff, 
Social Contract, chaps. 1–2; Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, chap. 5. 
4 The idea that the source of normative instances with binding force lies in agreements 
among those who will become the addressees of such normative instances is sometimes 
referred to as conventionalism, voluntarism, and contractarianism. Strictly speaking, 
these terms are inaccurate given that (1) social conventions are not necessarily 
dependent upon agreement in order to be binding; (2) not all agreements are described 
in the literature in terms of concurrence of wills; (3) not all agreements can adequately 
be described as contracts. The term voluntarism, for instance, usually expresses the 
view that a norm is binding if it follows solely from someone’s will, typically one who 
is in a position of authority; the opposite view is that of intellectualism, which bases a 
norm’s binding force solely upon its conformity with a principle of practical rationality. 
Most authors in medieval and in early modern political theory were able to strike a 




                                                                                                                                                                          
of normativity, even though some put their emphasis on voluntarism (e.g., Avicebron, 
John Selden, and the early Grotius), and others on intellectualism (e.g., Aquinas, Jean 
Gerson, Suarez, and the mature Grotius). 
5 Besides Gierke, Natural Law, and Gough, The Social Contract, see also Plamenatz, 
Man and Society, 155–64; Cassirer, Myth of the State, chap. 13; Murray, Political 
Consequences of the Reformation, 225–36; Atger, Essai sur l’histoire des doctrines, 
chap. 1; Riley, Will and Political Legitimacy; and the comprehensive bibliography in 
Höpfl and Thompson, “History of Contract.” 
6 The claim that the social contract was central to early modern political thought does 
not mean we should overlook the criticism levelled against it by prominent thinkers 
such as Montesquieu, Hume, and Adam Smith. What it does entail is that non-
contractarian modern political theories necessarily required for their justification an 
inclusion of arguments that strongly contested contractarianism within Enlightenment 
thought. One had to be a contractarian or an anti-contractarian—tertium non dabatur. 
7 For the difference between contractarianism and contractualism, see Darwall, 
Contractarianism/Contractualism. For the sake of argument, though, I shall use the 
contractarianism as synonymous with “social contract theory.” 
8 Riley, “How Coherent is the Social Contract Tradition?”  
9 Following Gierke, see Gough, The Social Contract, 2–3. 
10 Siedentop 2014, 151-222. 
11 Lessnoff, Social Contract, 5. 
12 The “school of Salamanca” usually refers to the sixteenth-century Iberian 
Scholasticism associated with Francisco de Vitoria. However, it was not limited to the 
University of Salamanca but spread  as an “ideological trade” to the universities of 




                                                                                                                                                                          
13 Molina, De iustitia et iure, I, col. 115. 
14 Mariana, De rege et regis institutione, 16. 
15 Suárez, Defensio fidei III, 2, 17; III, 19; De legibus II.XVII.9, and III.iii.6. 
16 The Spanish theologians include Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, Diego 
Covarrubías y Leyva, Melchor Cano, Alonso de Veracruz, Juan de la Peña, Serafim de 
Freitas; and, in Portugal, Martín de Azpilcueta (Dr. Navarrius), Martín de Ledesma, 
Fernando Pérez, Luis de Molina, Pedro Simões, Fernão Rebelo, Francisco Suarez. The 
missionaries include Bartolomé de las Casas, Manuel da Nóbrega, José de Acosta, Juan 
Zapata y Sandoval, and António Vieira. 
17 See, as an example, Martín de Azpilcueta’s (also known as Dr. Navarrius) explicit 
description: “The emperor receives the diadem and the crown from the Roman pontiff 
neither by divine institution nor by a power exclusively conferred upon him by Christ, 
but rather by human constitution added when transferring the imperium. … There is a 
further difference between the temporal and the spiritual power: namely, the fact that, 
even though both derive from God, the former only derives indirectly. The temporal 
power is instituted through an express or tacit election by the community, by means of 
which it grants to another that which was theirs, or through a succession grounded on 
such an election” (Relectio C. novit de iudiciis, adnot. III, 1548, fol. 79, 86). Similar 
thoughts can be found in Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio de Indis, I.2.2; Domingo de 
Soto, De iustitia et iure, bk. IV, q. II; Diego de Covarrubias y Leyva, Relectio in 
regulam peccatum, in Omnium Operum, vol. II, par. 9. 
18 For more on this mistaken view, often reproduced in the literature, see, e.g., Gough, 
The Social Contract, 68–71. 
19 Suárez, De legibus III.i.3. Also De legibus III.ii.4: “Men come together by individual 




                                                                                                                                                                          
each other through mutual organization for a single political end, and by that means to 
bring into being one mystical body, which in moral terms can be called an entity for its 
own sake and consequently needs a single political head.” 
20 Suárez, De legibus I.vi.19. 
21 This is sufficient for some interpreters to sustain that Suarez cannot be a social 
contract theorist. See, for instance, Gierke, Natural Law, 45; Rommen, Die Staatslehre 
des Franz Suarez, 112; Lewy, Constitutionalism and Statecraft, 42; Schrock, 
“Anachronism All Around,” 92. For further developments, see Schwartz, “Francisco 
Suarez.” Such a conclusion, however, rests on the premise that a social contract theory 
requires voluntarism and individualism, which is far from being axiomatic. 
22 See Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 157; Hamilton, Political 
Thought in Sixteenth-Century Spain, 3. 
23 James I sustained in his Apology for the Oath of Allegiance (1607) (to which he 
added his Premonition to LL Most Mighty Monarchs in 1609, and his Remonstrance for 
the Right of Kings in 1616) that monarchy was divinely ordained, that hereditary right 
was indefeasible, that kings were accountable to God alone, and that non-resistance and 
passive obedience were enjoined by God. Suarez set out to deconstruct these theses in 
his 1613 Defensio fidei Catholicae, in which he quotes extensively from Cardinal 
Bellarmine’s 1609 Apologia pro responsione ad librum Jacobi I. 
24 Höpfl and Thompson, “History of Contract.” 
25 Grotius, for instance, mentions in his De jure belli ac pacis, pacts between members 
of families as the onset of political authority as the outcome of the natural appetitus 
societatis that drives humans towards each other. However, for Grotius, it is men rather 




                                                                                                                                                                          
position and the new individualist view of natural rights. For further developments, see 
Campos, “Grotius’s Interdisciplinarity.”  
26 Other authors associated with the more radical forms of Enlightenment, such as 
Baron d’Holbach, can also be said to share this framework. Cf. Devellennes, “Fourth 
Musketeer of Social Contract Theory.” 
27 The terms baseline and reciprocity are from Sugden, “The Contractarian Enterprise.”  
28 Holmes, Passions and Constraint, 131. 
29 Campbell, Compendium of Roman Law, 117, 130. 
30 Hobbes, De Cive, II, 10, 193–95. 
31 Cf. Israel, Radical Enlightenment. According to Israel, the radical Enlightenment 
comprises several views and tendencies in the realms of science, theology, and politics. 
In matters of science, it embraces naturalism, mechanism, and materialism; in matters of 
theology, it denies a moral order to the universe, a providential god, the monotheistic 
account of creation, miracles, and reward and punishment in an afterlife; and in matters 
of politics, it supports republicanism and democracy, as well as  the necessity of 
toleration and the “freedom to philosophize.” For those who know Spinoza’s 
philosophy, this ought to sound familiar. There has been extensive criticism of this 
thesis in recent years, including, among others, Lilti, “Comment écrit-on l’histoire 
intellectelle des Lumières?”; La Vopa, “A New Intellectual History?” ; Chisick, 
“Interpreting the Enlightenment.”  
32 See, for instance, Wernham, Introduction to Spinoza, The Political Works, 25–27; 
Hallett, Creation, Emanation and Salvation, 176–201; Matheron, Individu et 
communauté, 307–30; and Den Uyl, Power, State and Freedom, 23–39. 




                                                                                                                                                                          
34 On the charge of poorly edited passages, see Madeleine Francès’s note in Spinoza 
1954, 1493–95. 
35 Spinoza, PT III, 12–16. 
36 Matheron, “Le problème de l’évolution de Spinoza.”  
37 Spinoza: “It is not the case that all men are naturally determined to behave according 
to the rules and laws of reason. On the contrary, all men are born completely ignorant of 
everything and before they can learn the true rationale of living and acquire the habit of 
virtue, a good part of life has elapsed” (TPT XVI, 196). 
38 Ibid., 198. 
39 Cf. Campos, Spinoza’s Revolutions in Natural Law, 112–26. 
40 For further developments and a closer engagement with Spinoza’s texts and 
secondary literature, see ibid., 138–47. 
41 See, for instance, Rawls, Theory of Justice, xviii. 
42 Black, “Juristic Origins.” 
43 Mackie, Ethics; Gauthier, Morals by Agreement. 
44 Scanlon, What We Owe. 
45 Rawls, Theory of Justice; Buchanan, Limits of Liberty. 
46 Cf. Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract, 19. 
47 Rawls, Theory of Justice, 16. 
48 This expression is found in Przeworski, “Minimalist Conception of Democracy,” 44. 
49 See Barker, Essays on Government, 90. 
50 Buchanan, Limits of Liberty, 3. 
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